Introduced protections against system command injection #17
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| <version>1.26.0-SNAPSHOT</version> | ||
| </parent> | ||
| <artifactId>sample-application</artifactId> | ||
| <dependencies> |
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This library holds security tools for protecting Java API calls.
License: MIT ✅ | Open source ✅ | More facts
| </plugin> | ||
| </plugins> | ||
| </build> | ||
| <dependencyManagement> |
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This library holds security tools for protecting Java API calls.
License: MIT ✅ | Open source ✅ | More facts
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Reviewer's Guide by SourceryThis PR implements security hardening for system command execution by replacing direct Runtime.exec() calls with a sandboxed SystemCommand.runCommand() from the java-security-toolkit library. The implementation adds dependency management for the security toolkit and updates the command execution code to use the safer alternative. Class diagram for SystemCommand integrationclassDiagram
class App {
+main(String[] args)
}
class Runtime {
+exec(String command)
}
class SystemCommand {
+runCommand(Runtime runtime, String command)
}
App --> Runtime : uses
App --> SystemCommand : uses
note for SystemCommand "Provides a sandboxed method to execute system commands safely."
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Micro-Learning Topic: OS command injection (Detected by phrase)Matched on "command injection"In many situations, applications will rely on OS provided functions, scripts, macros and utilities instead of reimplementing them in code. While functions would typically be accessed through a native interface library, the remaining three OS provided features will normally be invoked via the command line or launched as a process. If unsafe inputs are used to construct commands or arguments, it may allow arbitrary OS operations to be performed that can compromise the server. Try a challenge in Secure Code WarriorHelpful references
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Thanks @pixeebot[bot] for opening this PR! For COLLABORATOR only :
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OS Command Injection
DescriptionOS Command Injection (also known as Shell Injection) is a type of injection vulnerability wherein commands injected by an attacker are executed as system commands on the host operating system. OS Command Injection attacks are caused by insufficient input validation, although they are only possible if the web application code incorporates operating system calls with user input embedded in the invocation. Not to be confused with Code Injection, OS Command Injection extends the preset functionality of the application to execute system commands, whereas Code Injection attacks allow the attacker to add their own code to be executed by the application. In certain circumstances, Code Injection could be promoted to OS Command Injection by using the facilities provided by the language. OS Command Injection vulnerabilities are language agnostic, potentially appearing in any language with the provision to call a system shell command. Unfortunately, their ubiquity is a result of many programming languages, application development frameworks, and database platforms providing OS command execution facilities as value add for application designers looking for expedience to implement new features. Command Injections are one of a number of injection attacks, all of which are very prevalent and capable of extremely high levels of compromise. Indeed, OWASP has listed injection attacks as one of the most dangerous web application security risks since 2013. Read moreImpactMalicious attackers can leverage OS Command Injection vulnerabilities to gain a foothold in the hosting infrastructure, pivot to connected systems throughout the organisation, execute unauthorised commands and fully compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the application and the underlying system. There is no better publicly known breach that better illustrates the catastrophic fallout resulting from a successfully executed OS Command Injection than the infamous Equifax breach. Attackers were able to penetrate Equifax's systems by using a Command Injection attack, enabled by a vulnerability in a popular web framework. ScenariosOS Command Injections can be orchestrated on Windows and Unix systems, and they can affect any language that invokes a command via system shell. The classic scenario is a vulnerable program that calls the system("zip archive.zip " + filename)An attacker can exploit the code by leveraging special shell characters to append arbitrary commands at the end of the original one. The example below illustrates this in action; by sending zip archive.zip x; rm important_fileSince PreventionDevelopers must use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. Importantly, OS Command Injection vulnerabilities can be entirely prevented if developers stringently avoid OS Command call outs from the application layer. Alternative methods of implementing necessary levels of functionality almost always exist. If invoking the command shell is unavoidable, endeavor not to use functions that call out using a single string; rather, opt for functions that require a list of individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. TestingVerify that the application protects against OS command injection and that operating system calls use parameterized OS queries or use contextual command line output encoding.
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👋 Hi there!Everything looks good!
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PR Details of @pixeebot[bot] in java-design-patterns :
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The following issues were found in the pull request:
-
Too many consecutive line breaks:
- In the
page-object/pom.xmlfile, there are too many consecutive line breaks between the<build>and<dependencyManagement>tags. Please remove the extra line breaks to improve readability.
- In the
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Missing version in dependency:
- In the
page-object/sample-application/pom.xmlfile, the newly added dependency forjava-security-toolkitis missing the version tag. Please add the version tag to ensure the correct version of the dependency is used.
- In the
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Missing newline at end of file:
- The
page-object/sample-application/pom.xmlfile is missing a newline at the end of the file. Please add a newline to comply with standard file formatting practices.
- The
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Potential security issue:
- In the
page-object/sample-application/src/main/java/com/iluwatar/pageobject/App.javafile, the command execution usingSystemCommand.runCommandwithRuntime.getRuntime()could be a potential security risk if the input is not properly sanitized. Ensure that the input to the command is safe and does not allow for command injection.
- In the
Please address these issues to improve the quality and security of the code.
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Potential issues, bugs, and flaws that can introduce unwanted behavior:
Code suggestions and improvements for better exception handling, logic, standardization, and consistency:
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Thanks for opening this Pull Request!
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Micro-Learning Topic: Deserialization attack (Detected by phrase)Matched on "deserialization attack"It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, serialized data or code can be modified. This malformed data or unexpected data could be used to abuse application logic, deny service, or execute arbitrary code when deserialized. This is usually done with "gadget chains Try a challenge in Secure Code WarriorHelpful references
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Please double check the following review of the pull request:Issues counts
Changes in the diff
Identified Issues
Issue ExplanationID 1: Best Practices
Suggested Code Fix// Ensure that the SystemCommand.runCommand method is well-documented
// Example documentation:
SystemCommand.runCommand(Runtime.getRuntime(), "cmd.exe start " + applicationFile);
/**
* Executes a system command securely.
*
* @param runtime the Runtime instance to execute the command
* @param command the system command to execute
* @throws IOException if an I/O error occurs
*/Explanation of the FixThe fix involves adding documentation to the Missing Tests for Incoming ChangesTo ensure the new security feature works as intended, consider adding the following tests:
Summon me to re-review when updated! Yours, Gooroo.dev |
FeedbackGreat job on adding protections against system command injection using Minor suggestion:
Keep up the good work! |
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🎉🥳 Looks like issue resolved, feel free to reopen, if not. |
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Micro-Learning Topic: Code injection (Detected by phrase)Matched on "Code Injection"Code injection happens when an application insecurely accepts input that is subsequently used in a dynamic code evaluation call. If insufficient validation or sanitisation is performed on the input, specially crafted inputs may be able to alter the syntax of the evaluated code and thus alter execution. In a worst case scenario, an attacker could run arbitrary code in the server context and thus perform almost any action on the application server. Try a challenge in Secure Code WarriorHelpful references
Micro-Learning Topic: Injection attack (Detected by phrase)Matched on "Injection attack"Injection flaws, such as SQL, NoSQL, OS, and LDAP injection, occur when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The attacker’s hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended commands or accessing data without proper authorization. Source: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project Try a challenge in Secure Code WarriorHelpful references
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🎉🥳 Looks like issue resolved, feel free to reopen, if not. |
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| } else { | ||
| // java Desktop not supported - above unlikely to work for Windows so try instead... | ||
| Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd.exe start " + applicationFile); | ||
| SystemCommand.runCommand(Runtime.getRuntime(), "cmd.exe start " + applicationFile); |
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The use of SystemCommand.runCommand to execute a system command (cmd.exe start) poses a significant security risk. This method of opening files can be susceptible to command injection if the file path is manipulated or not properly sanitized. Recommendation: Consider safer alternatives such as using the Java Desktop API across all platforms or handling file paths more securely to prevent potential command injection.
| SystemCommand.runCommand(Runtime.getRuntime(), "cmd.exe start " + applicationFile); | ||
| } | ||
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| } catch (IOException ex) { |
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The exception handling in this block only logs the error without providing a user notification or a recovery mechanism. This approach might leave the user unaware of the failure if they do not have access to the logs. Recommendation: Enhance the error handling by implementing a user notification system or a retry mechanism to improve the application's robustness and user experience.
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Auto Pull Request Review from LlamaPReview
1. Overview
1.1 PR Summary
- Business value and requirements alignment: The primary purpose of this PR is to enhance the security of the application by introducing protections against system command injection. This aligns with security best practices and improves the application's robustness against potential exploits.
- Key components modified: The PR modifies
pom.xmlfiles to include thejava-security-toolkitdependency andApp.javato replace direct calls toRuntime#exec()withSystemCommand#runCommand(). - Impact assessment: The changes enhance security by preventing command chaining and blocking arguments targeting sensitive files. This is a significant improvement in preventing command injection attacks.
- System dependencies and integration impacts: The introduction of the
java-security-toolkitdependency impacts dependency management and system command execution.
1.2 Architecture Changes
- System design modifications: The PR introduces the
java-security-toolkitfor secure command execution, enhancing the overall security architecture. - Component interactions: The changes affect how system commands are executed, with
SystemCommand#runCommand()replacing direct calls toRuntime#exec(). - Integration points: The new dependency on
java-security-toolkitintroduces a new integration point for command execution.
2. Detailed Technical Analysis
2.1 Code Logic Deep-Dive
Core Logic Changes
page-object/sample-application/src/main/java/com/iluwatar/pageobject/App.java
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Submitted PR Code:
- Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd.exe start " + applicationFile); + SystemCommand.runCommand(Runtime.getRuntime(), "cmd.exe start " + applicationFile);
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Analysis:
- Current logic and potential issues: The original code directly calls
Runtime#exec(), which is vulnerable to command injection attacks. - Edge cases and error handling: The new code introduces
SystemCommand#runCommand(), which attempts to parse the command and throw aSecurityExceptionif multiple commands are present or if sensitive files are targeted. - Cross-component impact: The change affects how system commands are executed, potentially impacting any command that uses
Runtime#exec(). - Business logic considerations: Improves security by preventing potential exploits.
- Current logic and potential issues: The original code directly calls
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LlamaPReview Suggested Improvements:
// No suggested improvements for this specific change as it aligns with the intended security enhancement. -
Improvement rationale:
- Technical benefits: Enhances security by preventing command injection.
- Business value: Protects the application from potential security breaches.
- Risk assessment: Reduces the risk of command injection attacks.
Cross-cutting Concerns
- Data flow analysis: Ensure that the data flow for command execution is secure and validated.
- State management implications: No significant state management implications identified.
- Error propagation paths: Ensure that
SystemCommand#runCommand()handles exceptions related to command execution comprehensively. - Edge case handling across components: Test for command chaining and sensitive file targeting across different operating systems.
Algorithm & Data Structure Analysis
- Complexity analysis: The changes introduce additional complexity in command execution to enhance security.
- Performance implications: Evaluate the performance impact of using
SystemCommand#runCommand()versus directRuntime#exec()calls. - Memory usage considerations: Assess any potential memory leaks or resource management issues introduced by the new dependency.
2.2 Implementation Quality
- Code organization and structure: The changes are well-organized, with dependency management in
pom.xmland command execution inApp.java. - Design patterns usage: The use of
SystemCommand#runCommand()aligns with security best practices. - Error handling approach: The new code introduces
SystemCommand#runCommand(), which should handle exceptions related to command execution comprehensively. - Resource management: Ensure that the new dependency does not introduce resource management issues.
3. Critical Findings
3.1 Potential Issues
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🔴 Critical Issues:
- Issue description: No critical issues identified.
- Impact: N/A
- Recommendation: N/A
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🟡 Warnings:
- Warning description: Ensure comprehensive testing for
SystemCommand#runCommand()across different operating systems and command structures. - Potential risks: Incomplete testing may lead to undetected security vulnerabilities.
- Suggested improvements: Conduct thorough testing to cover all edge cases and operating systems.
- Warning description: Ensure comprehensive testing for
3.2 Code Quality Concerns
- Maintainability aspects: The changes are straightforward and easy to understand, improving maintainability.
- Readability issues: No significant readability issues identified.
- Performance bottlenecks: Evaluate the performance impact of using
SystemCommand#runCommand().
4. Security Assessment
4.1 Security Considerations
- Authentication/Authorization impacts: N/A
- Data handling concerns: Ensure that the data flow for command execution is secure and validated.
- Input validation: Validate all inputs passed to
SystemCommand#runCommand()to prevent injection attacks. - Security best practices: The changes align with security best practices by preventing command injection.
4.2 Vulnerability Analysis
- Potential security risks: Ensure comprehensive testing for
SystemCommand#runCommand()to cover all edge cases. - Mitigation strategies: Conduct thorough testing and regularly update the
java-security-toolkitdependency. - Security testing requirements: Ensure comprehensive unit and integration test coverage for
SystemCommand#runCommand().
5. Testing Strategy
5.1 Test Coverage
- Unit test analysis: Ensure
SystemCommand#runCommand()is tested for various command scenarios. - Integration test requirements: Test integration with
Runtime#exec()to ensure proper handling. - Edge cases coverage: Test for command chaining and sensitive file targeting.
5.2 Test Recommendations
Suggested Test Cases
@Test
public void testSystemCommandRunCommand() {
// Test command chaining prevention
// Test blocking sensitive file access
// Test different operating systems and command structures
}- Coverage improvements: Ensure comprehensive test coverage for
SystemCommand#runCommand(). - Performance testing needs: Conduct performance tests to evaluate the impact of the new dependency.
6. Documentation & Maintenance
- Documentation updates needed: Update documentation to reflect the new security measures and the use of
java-security-toolkit. - Long-term maintenance considerations: Ensure that the new dependency is well-documented and its usage is consistent across the codebase.
- Technical debt and monitoring requirements: Regularly update the
java-security-toolkitdependency to address any newly discovered vulnerabilities.
7. Deployment & Operations
- Deployment impact and strategy: Evaluate the impact of the new dependency on the deployment process.
- Key operational considerations: Ensure adequate monitoring and debugging capabilities for command execution.
8. Summary & Recommendations
8.1 Key Action Items
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Critical changes required:
- [No critical changes identified]
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Important improvements suggested:
- Ensure comprehensive testing for
SystemCommand#runCommand()across different operating systems and command structures.
- Ensure comprehensive testing for
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Best practices to implement:
- Validate all inputs passed to
SystemCommand#runCommand()to prevent injection attacks. - Regularly update the
java-security-toolkitdependency to address any newly discovered vulnerabilities.
- Validate all inputs passed to
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Cross-cutting concerns to address:
- Ensure that the data flow for command execution is secure and validated.
- Conduct thorough testing to cover all edge cases and operating systems.
8.2 Future Considerations
- Technical evolution path: Continuously improve security measures and update dependencies to address new vulnerabilities.
- Business capability evolution: Enhance application security to protect against emerging threats.
- System integration impacts: Ensure seamless integration of new security measures with existing systems.
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Issues Summary1. Project not foundLogs Summary: Failed to execute goal org.sonarsource.scanner.maven:sonar-maven-plugin:3.9.1.2184:sonar (default-cli) on project java-design-patterns: Project not found. Please check the 'sonar.projectKey' and 'sonar.organization' properties, the 'SONAR_TOKEN' environment variable, or contact the project administrator to check the permissions of the user the token belongs toFailing Step: org.sonarsource.scanner.maven:sonar-maven-plugin:3.9.1.2184:sonar (default-cli) Related Source Files: java-design-patterns Related Failures: ℹ️ Help(You can turn this bot off by adding a comment/ai off, or force a refresh of this report with /ai ...)
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Mira activated! 💜 My mission? Code that’s as elegant as it is effective. Let’s bring out the best in every line together. ⚡ Ready for the next level? 🔮 Following Modern Python Best Practices, let's optimize the handling of system commands by encapsulating it within a function: import io.github.pixee.security.SystemCommand;
public static void main(String[] args) {
try {
if (Desktop.isDesktopSupported()) {
Desktop.getDesktop().open(applicationFile);
} else {
// java Desktop not supported - above unlikely to work for Windows so try instead...
SystemCommand.runCommand(Runtime.getRuntime(), "cmd.exe start " + applicationFile);
}
} catch (IOException ex) {
// Handle IOException
}
}📖 References: |
This change hardens all instances of Runtime#exec() to offer protection against attack.
Left unchecked,
Runtime#exec()can execute any arbitrary system command. If an attacker can control part of the strings used to as program paths or arguments, they could execute arbitrary programs, install malware, and anything else they could do if they had a shell open on the application host.Our change introduces a sandbox which protects the application:
The default restrictions applied are the following:
SystemCommand#runCommand()attempts to parse the given command, and throw aSecurityExceptionif multiple commands are present./etc/passwd, so the sandbox prevents arguments that point to these files that may be targets for exfiltration.There are more options for sandboxing if you are interested in locking down system commands even more.
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Summary by Sourcery
Implement protections against system command injection by utilizing the java-security-toolkit to replace Runtime#exec() with a secure alternative, SystemCommand#runCommand(). This change introduces a sandbox to prevent command chaining and restrict arguments targeting sensitive files.
New Features:
Enhancements: